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Just after midnight on 30 October 2002 eightbombs rocked Soweto, South Africa’s largesttownship. Seven of the blasts destroyed
commuter railway lines running through the
township, inconveniencing more than 200,000
commuters. The eighth blast occurred at a mosque,
causing parts of the building to collapse. A hitherto
unknown organisation, Die Boeremag (Boer
force/power) claimed responsibility for the
bombings.
During 2002 almost two dozen alleged Boeremag
members – including serving military officers –
were arrested and charged with terrorism-related
offences, sabotage and high treason. After
uncovering a Boeremag weapons cache, the
national commissioner of police, Jackie Selebi,
revealed that there were about 100 key Boeremag
members in the country, many of whom have
access to defence force weapons. Selebi pointed
out that most of the suspects were young – between
the ages of 17 and 40 years – and that many of the
suspects were qualified professionals and
prosperous farmers.
South Africa’s industry, wealth and human capital
are concentrated in a few metropolitan areas. A
number of powerful bombs, strategically placed,
could cause considerable harm to South Africa’s
fragile economy. Alternatively, the assassination of a
handful of cabinet ministers and popular black
political or religious leaders could take the country
to the brink of a race war.
Before 1994
In order to evaluate the threat the white right poses
to South Africa’s internal security, it is vital to
understand the historical context in which the white
right – and more particularly the Afrikaner right –
came about. The emergence of the contemporary
white right must be understood against the
background of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism in
the twentieth century. Throughout their history
Afrikaner nationalists believed that the only way to
protect the status and identity of the Afrikaner, and
to prevent the group from being dominated by
other ethnic groups or races, was to exercise power
through self-determination in an ethnically
homogenous territory.1
A significant weakness of the white right is its
internal divisions on issues of policy and strategy,
and personality-driven differences. Notwithstanding
such divisions, however, Afrikaner nationalists
argue that they share three common ethnic
attributes: the Afrikaans language, Calvinist religion,
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and Afrikaner history, with its claim to an own
territory or volkstaat (people’s state). While race is not
specifically mentioned as an attribute, it is implied in
the understanding the Afrikaner right has of ethnicity.2
In the late 1980s the white right had significant
support among Afrikaners. In the 1989 election the
white right enjoyed the support of the majority of
Afrikaners in the then Transvaal and Orange Free
State provinces. In 1992 close to a million white
South Africans voted against sharing political power
with black people at central government level 
(Figure 1).
In the run-up to the country’s first democratic
election based on universal adult suffrage in 1994,
the white right arguably had the capacity to push the
country into a civil war and unilaterally establish an
exclusive white, Afrikaner volkstaat in a part of South
Africa.
In the post-1994 era most right-wing whites,
disillusioned by the political impotence of right-wing
organisations and leaders, have withdrawn from
political activity. Some try to withdraw from the
realities of the new South Africa by moving into
gated communities. Others – especially the younger
generation – are emigrating.
Appearance of the Boeremag
However, a few isolated, but significant, violent
incidents after 1994 reveal that there is some activity
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on the fringes of the white right. The most significant
of these have been the actions of the Boeremag. 
The unexpected appearance of the Boeremag means
that there are groups of hardcore right-wingers who
are tenaciously devoted to creating an Afrikaner
state.
The story of the Boeremag makes a fascinating case
study of how the extreme right mixes religion and
politics. The Boeremag’s sabotage campaign was
driven by a philosophy based on extreme nationalist
views and a sense of God-given purpose: a lethal
cocktail, given the damage religiously inspired
terrorism has caused in
other parts of the world. 
It is apparent from
documents confiscated
from alleged Boeremag
members that the
organisation is motivated
by prophecies made in the
early twentieth century by
a Boer seer, Nicolaas van
Rensburg. Indeed, there
are strong indications that
the insurrectionist plans of
the Boeremag were at
least partly motivated by
Van Rensburg’s
prophecies.
Van Rensburg predicted the coming into power “of
a black government”, but that this would be of a
short duration only. During this time, “hostility from
Indian ranks reaches a crisis over the Afrikaans
language... the language of the Boers and everything
connected with it is now being denied and trampled
upon. All the protests of the Boer fall on deaf ears.”
Van Rensburg further said “a day will come when
the Indians will occupy positions of power in the
country. The Christian values of the Afrikaner will
then be in direct conflict with the religion of Islam.”3
The Boeremag makes a good case study, for another
reason. Initially underestimated by the police and
the intelligence community, the danger posed by the
organisation grew to become South Africa’s primary
security threat in late 2002.
Figure 1: Number of votes received by the white right, 1970-1999
Source: Van Rooyen, SA Institute of Race Relations
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The police successfully identified and arrested key
Boeremag suspects, bringing to a halt the bombing
campaign before it resulted in any major loss of life.
The police’s success was largely based on good
intelligence work. With these arrests the police
seriously disrupted the plans of the Boeremag.
However, if the Boeremag is organised in a cell-like
structure (which seems likely), it is probable that
some individual cells have gone unnoticed by the
police.
Mobilising support
The number of extreme right-wingers who are
prepared to use violence to achieve their aims is
likely to be small, and unlikely to ever engender the
active participation of most Afrikaners. It is a
sobering fact, however, that for a sabotage
campaign to be successful and create long term
instability, this is not necessary. At the height of its
activities the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had no
more than a few hundred active members. The
secret of the IRA’s success was that it had a large
number of sympathisers who provided the
organisation with logistical support. In South Africa
a small group of right-wing saboteurs will be
difficult to apprehend if they are viewed
sympathetically by Afrikaners in general.
A confiscated Boeremag document reveals how the
organisation seeks to give a populist spin to its
activities. The document cites post-1994 levels of
crime, unjust affirmative action policies, and the
sidelining of the Afrikaans language as reasons why
an independent Afrikaner state is justified. Given
the current high levels of violent crime, rising white
unemployment, and the state-sponsored campaign
against farmers in neighbouring Zimbabwe, such
arguments may be capable of eliciting widespread
sympathy among conservatively-minded Afrikaners.
Moreover, under certain circumstances, and with a
right-wing organisation capable of exploiting
popular Afrikaner grievances, it is possible that a
right-wing sabotage campaign could be condoned –
and even tacitly supported – by a significant
number of Afrikaners.
The state needs to guard against alienating the
broader ethnic community in which the white right
operates. The white right should not be allowed to
succeed in creating martyrs whose ‘suffering’ and
‘sacrifices’ can be idealised and used to enlist new
impressionable young recruits.
Supposing conservative Afrikaners did support the
state’s fight against right-wing saboteurs, this
support could rapidly be undermined in the event
of security force excesses. The perception can then
be fostered that the security forces (and by
implication the government), are victimising
members of the ethnic group in general. With time,
and depending on the extent of the abuses, a
significant number of Afrikaners, and not only right-
wing extremists, may begin to view the security
forces as the real enemy. Once this happens a small
but substantial number of Afrikaners may stop co-
operating with law enforcement agencies, and even
develop sympathies for the extremists amongst
them.
There are already allegations that Boeremag
suspects have been tortured by the police.
According to press reports a homeless white man
was mistakenly arrested in connection with the
Soweto Boeremag bombings. The man alleges that
the police tortured him, which included giving him
electric shocks to his toes, and demanded
information about bombs and right-wing operatives.
The legal representative of some of the arrested
Boeremag members has also alleged that his clients
were tortured by the police.
It would be a victory for the extreme white right if
any of these allegations turn out to be true. Firstly, it
could result in the acquittal of guilty accused if
crucial confessions were made under duress and
torture. This would be an acute embarrassment to
the criminal justice system and the government,
while providing a moral boost to the extreme right.
Secondly, such abuses would enable the extreme
right to create the martyrs they need to sustain
support and enthusiasm for their cause.
Coup d’état
It would however seem that the extreme white right
cannot attract sufficient popular support, nor
develop the organisational capacity to execute a
coup d’état. According to military analyst Rocklyn
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Williams it is vital that a number of preconditions
are in place for a coup to be successful in any
country (all of which are absent in respect of the
South African right wing):
• A high level of political will and mass 
mobilisation must exist to ensure that the coup
plotters possess the required levels of legitimacy
and political support.
• The coup plotters need to be able to secure 
control over the most important of the country’s
strategic installations. In a country as large,
complex and organised as South Africa this is
close to impossible to achieve.
• The majority of the officers’ corps, or a 
significant part thereof, need to support the
objectives of the coup, and possess the political
will to govern.
With every passing year since 1994 the extreme
white right’s chances of violently taking power, or
establishing an independent Afrikaner state, have
diminished. Most of the country’s senior civil
servants are African National Congress (ANC)
appointees. The South African National Defence
Force (SANDF) and South African Police Service
(SAPS) have become multiracial organisations at all
command levels. Moreover, many senior officers in
the defence force and the police who held right-
wing beliefs have been sidelined or given early
retirement.
In mid-1991 some 43% of the police personnel in
the former South African Police (SAP) were white.
Officers’ ranks were virtually exclusively white.
Even in mid-1994, some 95% of the officer corps in
the SAP were white. At the end of 2002 the picture
looks very different: just over a quarter (26%) of all
police personnel in the SAPS are white, and just
under half (48%) of the commissioned officers and
22% of the non-commissioned officers are white.
Conclusion
In a democracy it is not an easy task to deal
effectively with a sustained terrorist threat. Civil
liberties, constitutionally entrenched rights and the
rule of law come at a cost when it comes to fighting
terrorism: the state has to expend considerable
resources and patiently collect evidence over
frustratingly lengthy periods of time to successfully
convict the kingpins in a closely knit terrorist
network. This requires excellent teamwork between
the various intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, and a motivated and specialised
investigating and prosecuting unit devoted to
identifying and convicting terrorists.
Even more difficult to deal with is an ethnocentric
and religiously inspired terrorist campaign. Such a
campaign can successfully take advantage of
popular grievances against the central government,
and exploit ethnically based aspirations for greater
political and cultural autonomy.
To crack an isolated terror cell is possible. To defeat
a band of terrorists who are abetted in their actions
by a growing group of sympathisers spread across
large parts of the country is almost impossible. The
former can be done through good police and
intelligence work alone. The latter requires a
political solution.
To ensure their long-term success, terrorists need
the support of parts of the community in which they
live. Terrorists – discounting the exceptional loner
who works on his own – are members of bigger
groups and gangs that provide them with logistical
support and finances to further their cause. Terrorists
who live and hide among people who do not co-
operate with law enforcement agencies can be a
state’s biggest nightmare. Such a scenario must be
avoided at all costs in South Africa.
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